The offer window on the TSA Gold+ IDIQ closed July 23. Within days, three airports had publicly committed: Tampa International, Des Moines International, and Charleston International in South Carolina. Des Moines transitions in January 2027. Charleston follows in February. Tampa in May.
Most coverage has treated this as a privatization story. The contracting record tells a more specific one. TSA has published two sets of responses to industry questions on the Gold+ solicitation, and those documents describe an economic structure that has received almost no attention: contractors will be required to fund checkpoint modernization from a price ceiling that, by TSA’s own explanation, does not include technology.
This article draws on TSA Gold+ solicitation 70T05026R5900N005, Questions and Answers Sets 1 and 2, posted to SAM.gov.
What the airports said
The three airports gave different public rationales, and the differences are informative.
Tampa framed the decision around resilience and modernization, citing reduced disruption risk from lapses in federal appropriations and greater flexibility in exploring new screening infrastructure. Des Moines tied it to its new terminal, describing newer technology that moves people through the checkpoint more efficiently. Charleston led with workforce, framing the decision as investing in the people who protect travelers by providing better tools and greater workplace stability.
Resilience, technology, workforce. None led with cost reduction. The contracting documents suggest why that framing would have been difficult.
The ceiling that does not include technology
Under the Aviation and Transportation Security Act, a private screening contract cannot cost the government more than federal screening at the same airport. TSA implements this through a Federal Cost Estimate calculated for each airport before its task order is solicited. A proposal priced above the FCE is ineligible for award.
The question industry asked was whether the FCE accounts for technology. TSA’s answer is unambiguous: the FCE is calculated based on the cost of security screening services as a whole and does not include technology. All technology costs, including procurement, maintenance, and upgrades, must be incorporated into the overall pricing proposed by the contractor.
TSA elaborated that the FCE represents the government’s cost to provide screening at the relevant airport and does not include the government’s cost of staff it will continue to provide during the Gold+ contract.
Read together, this is the central economic fact of Gold+. The ceiling is derived from what federal screening operations cost. Everything the contractor must fund beyond that, including capital equipment, lifecycle refresh, and maintenance of the entire installed base, has to fit underneath the same number. TSA expects modernization to be financed from efficiencies found within a federal labor cost baseline.
Whether that arithmetic works is the question the first task orders will answer.
Maintenance transfers immediately, and the OEM problem
The contracting record settles a question that press coverage has not addressed: what happens to equipment TSA already owns at a transitioning airport.
Contractors may operate it. The PWS allows the contractor to continue operating existing government furnished equipment during transition, phasing it out as modernized equipment is deployed. TSA is explicit that the expectation is for vendors to propose and install modernized equipment as part of their solution, and that vendors may operate existing TSA owned equipment during transition in and the early stages of contract execution.
But operation comes with immediate liability. The PWS states that effective immediately upon commencement of contract performance, the contractor assumes full responsibility for operating, managing, and maintaining all TSA owned equipment. TSA will provide twelve months of historical maintenance data including age, operational availability, and critical and non critical failure counts. Existing TSA maintenance contracts cover the equipment only through the end of the transition period, after which the contractor stands alone.
Then comes the constraint that will shape teaming. TSA will not add the contractor to existing TSA maintenance contracts, including those with proprietary or exclusive original equipment manufacturers. The contractor must enter its own agreements with equipment manufacturers to support the contract scope.
This is not a minor administrative detail. TSA confirmed it will require offerors to demonstrate relationships with all applicable security equipment OEMs relevant to the equipment at each airport. The Acceptable Capabilities List designates sole source manufacturers for certain items, and a contractor inheriting a checkpoint must reach commercial terms with each of them, at whatever price those manufacturers set, while bound to a fixed price proposal submitted earlier.
An offeror’s ability to secure OEM maintenance agreements, training, and parts access is therefore not merely a performance question. It is an award criterion.
The performance risk sits entirely with the prime
Gold+ task orders carry financial disincentives of two, four, and six percent of the total monthly invoice when two, four, or six of ten performance metrics are missed in a month.
Industry asked whether a prime could dispute or reallocate a penalty triggered by equipment malfunction rather than workforce performance. TSA’s answer was direct: it holds the prime contractor accountable for all performance metrics and the application of any financial disincentives. The contract provides no mechanism to reallocate credit based on root cause, and TSA does not involve itself in subcontractor relationships or internal allocations.
A prime therefore absorbs penalties for equipment failures on machines it did not select, purchased by the government, maintained under agreements it must negotiate with manufacturers it does not control. That risk is priced into a firm fixed price proposal, over ten years, against a ceiling that excludes technology.
TSA also requires offerors to demonstrate a financial mechanism sufficient to fund continued screening for 180 days in the event of default or financial distress, and confirmed the FCE will not reflect any cost associated with establishing or maintaining that reserve.
Why the qualification base constrains the early years
TSA will accept only equipment that has met its standards and appears on the Acceptable Capabilities List or has been approved through established testing. Equipment certified by ECAC and deployed operationally outside the United States will not be accepted without further assessment.
For checked baggage, TSA disclosed that the qualified products list is expected to reopen in FY28, and that it may work with Gold+ vendors on test site designation to support future qualification.
That timing matters. The first task orders will be competed and performed years before that pathway opens. A contractor’s deployable technology set in the early ordering period is bounded by what is already qualified, regardless of what exists elsewhere in the world market. Capabilities not yet on the ACL may still be proposed, but TSA will score them on the realism of the transition path, with the strongest credit going to listed and approved capabilities.
What the ceiling implies about scale
One figure in the contracting record has not surfaced in press coverage. Asked how many airports TSA anticipates transitioning, the agency said it has set no annual targets, but that the $12.9 billion ceiling is based on a forecast assuming up to approximately 190 airports of various sizes could participate over the ten year period.
Three airports have committed to date, against a ceiling sized for roughly 190. Whether that gap closes depends on airport by airport opt in decisions, contractor appetite after the first task orders reveal the real economics, and a political environment that remains unsettled.
The American Federation of Government Employees, representing approximately 47,000 TSA officers, opposes the program, arguing it departs from the screening system Congress created after September 11. Supporters note that more than 80 percent of Europe’s commercial airports use private screening, a figure cited by the Cato Institute. This publication takes no position on that dispute. Both the general case and the local execution are separate questions, and the second will be answered airport by airport.
What to watch
For airports still deciding, and for contractors weighing task order bids, the contracting record points to a specific set of questions.
Whether the FCE at a given airport leaves room for meaningful modernization once labor is priced at statutory minimums. Whether OEM commercial terms for legacy equipment can be secured before a fixed price is committed. Whether the twelve months of maintenance history TSA provides is sufficient to price the failure risk on an aging installed base. And whether contractors will bid the second and third task orders after the first ones establish what the arithmetic actually looks like.
TSA has said proposals must remain valid for 240 calendar days, and that Phase 2, including airport specific requirements and pricing templates, will be released after Phase 1 evaluation. The first real numbers will appear then.
Primary source: TSA Gold+ solicitation 70T05026R5900N005, Questions and Answers Sets 1 and 2 (SAM.gov). Additional reporting: Federal News Network (July 2026); CNN (July 20, 2026); CBS News (July 2026); Washington Times (July 23, 2026); PBS NewsHour (July 2026); AirlineGeeks (July 23, 2026). Airport transition dates as reported by The New York Times and confirmed in airport statements.